



















In this paper I show that the validity of the Indifference Principle (IP) in light of its related 
paradoxes, is still an open question. I do so by offering an analysis of IP and its related paradoxes 
in the way they are manifested within the framework of Kolmogorov's probability theory. I 
describe the conditions that any mathematical formalization of IP must satisfy. Consequently, I 
show that IP's mathematical formalization has to be a set of constrains (C) on probability spaces 
which mathematically describe the same events. I claim that the question whether IP related 
paradoxes undermine the validity of IP depends on the fact whether such a C exist. Since 
currently there is no mathematical proof of the existence of such a C, nor of the impossibility of 




1. The Indifference Principle 
Bertrand's Paradox and similar paradoxes (such as the Box Factory Paradox and the Wine Water 
Paradox) are commonly presented as examples which undermine and even refute the 
Indifference Principle (IP). There is a vast literature about IP and its related paradoxes. Many 
scholars have offered different solutions to these paradoxes with the aim of salvaging IP ((Jaynes 
1973; Strevens 1998; Bangu 2010; Mikkelson 2004; Tissier 1984; Di Porto et al. 2011, 2010; 
Burock 2005)), while others have objected to them. Some scholars have claimed that the 
paradoxes simply cannot be solved and hence that IP faces a real problem ((Shackel 2007; 
Deakin 2006; Howson and Urbach 2006; Rowbottom 2013; Milne 1983)). Other scholars have 
claimed that the different paradoxes are not "real" paradoxes to begin with and hence that IP is 
valid ((Gyenis and Rédei 2014; Marinoff 1994; Aerts and de Bianchi 2014)). 
The literature about IP and its related paradoxes keeps growing (for example: (Drory 2015; 
Gyenis and Rédei 2014; Aerts and de Bianchi 2014)) which shows the ongoing interest in this 
topic. More importantly, it shows that there is no consensus on which of the proposed 
explanations to IP's paradoxes is correct. This lack of consensus can be attributed in part to the 
lack of consensus regarding which of the interpretations of probability is the "right" one1. This is 
because almost all the proposed explanations to IP's paradoxes are offered within a framework of 
a specific interpretation of probability (sometimes implicitly). As such these explanations are 
commonly based on assumptions which are part of specific interpretations and not necessarily 
shared by other interpretations of probability. Usually these assumptions are important to the 
different explanations since they concern the nature of probability (and hence IP and its 
paradoxes). To my best knowledge there has not been almost any attempt to explain IP and its 
related paradoxes without relying on assumptions which belong to specific interpretations of 
probability2. My aim in this paper is to fill this lacuna.  
In this paper I explain IP and its paradoxes based on how they are manifested in Kolmogorov's 
probability theory. Kolmogorov's theory is widely considered as the standard mathematical 
probability theory and the different interpretations are commonly considered as interpretations of 
                                                 
1 See (Gillies 2000; Hájek 2012) for good surveys of the different interpretations of probability, (Von Plato 1994) 
for a more historical perspective and (Lyon 2010) for a short survey which emphasizes the major problems each of 
the main interpretation faces. 
2 Deakin's discussion of the Wine Water Paradox in (Deakin 2006) is a step in this direction, 
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Kolmogorov's theory3. The distinction between mathematical probability theories such as 
Kolmogorov's, and philosophical probability theories known as "interpretations of probability", 
is widely accepted in the philosophy of probability. Roughly, the difference between these two 
types of theories is that they address different questions regarding the basic notions: 'probability' 
and 'event'4. According to Lyon, mathematical probability theories "[...] tell us how probabilities 
behave, how to calculate probabilities from other probabilities, but they do not tell us what 
probabilities are." (Lyon 2010, 93). The latter question is answered by interpretations of 
probability. Hence it can be said that mathematical probability theories provide the mathematical 
parts of the definitions of 'probability' and 'event', while interpretations provide the non-
mathematical parts. 
 
In this paper I analyze IP and its related paradoxes in the way they could (or should) be 
mathematically formalized within Kolmogorov's theory. My analysis relies on the common 
assumption that Kolmogorov's probability space is a correct mathematical description of the 
notions: 'probability' and 'event'. This assumption seems to be in common to all the main 
interpretations of probability. As such my analysis is relevant to all interpretations of 
Kolmogorov's theory. More specifically, I describe the conditions that a mathematical 
formalization of IP within Kolmogorov's theory must satisfy and show that such a formalization 
has to be a set of constrains (C) on probability spaces that have the equivalent σ-algebra 
components. These σ-algebras are equivalent in the sense that they mathematically describe the 
same events. As a result, the question whether IP related paradoxes undermine the validity of IP 
turns out to depend on the fact whether such a C exist. Since currently there is no mathematical 
proof of the existence of such a C (or a proof of the impossibility of there being one) the question 
remains open.  
 
                                                 
3 However, see (Lyon 2016) and (Hájek 2012) for objections to this common view. 
4 'Probability' here is used as a general term for notions such as: credence, degree of belief, propensity, chance etc. 
Similarly, 'event' is used as a general term for anything that has a 'probability' (for example: a proposition, a state pf 
the world, a metaphysical event, etc.)  
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The term "Principle of Indifference" was first coined by Keynes. According to him "[t]he 
Principle of Indifference asserts that if there is no known reason for predicating of our subject 
one rather than another of several alternatives, then relatively to such knowledge the assertions 
of each of these alternatives have an equal probability. Thus equal probabilities must be assigned 
to each of several arguments, if there is an absence of positive ground for assigning unequal 
ones." (Keynes 1921, 45). Interestingly, in the literature there are other phrasings of IP which are 
slightly different than Keynes'. For example, Bartha and Johns describe IP in the following way: 
"In the absence of any known reason to assign two outcomes different probabilities, they ought 
to be assigned the same probability." (Bartha and Johns 2001, 109). Howson and Urbach's 
describe IP as asserting that "[...] equal parts of the possibility space should receive equal 
probabilities relative to a null state of background information." (Howson and Urbach 2006, 266) 
and according to Mellor "[IP] says that evidence which gives us no reason to think that any one 
of a number of mutually exclusive possibilities [...] is more probable than any other will give 
those possibilities equal epistemic probabilities." (Mellor 2005, 28), and the list goes on. These 
different phrasings show that there is no consensus regarding the exact phrasing of IP. However, 
almost all of them seem to have the same three components which I describe in the next section. 
Roughly, in all of IP's phrasings it is assumed that events are comparable and that equivalent 
events should have equal probabilities if there is no information indicating otherwise. The 
differences between the different phrasings are mainly in the events' equivalence criteria. These 
differences depend on the exact definition of 'events' which in turn depends on the choice of 
interpretation of probability. 
 
IP is commonly treated as an epistemic principle in the sense that it is a principle that an agent 
can use when she has to assign subjective probabilities (such as degrees of belief or credences) to 
propositions (i.e. "subjective events"). As such, IP is commonly thought of as relevant only to 
subjective interpretations of probability. However, IP also appears in discussions within the 
framework of the classical interpretation and other interpretations in which probabilities and 
events are considered as objective. In such discussions, IP is treated as a tool that agents use to 
infer the events' objective probabilities (commonly referred to as "chances" or "propensities"). 
Thus, although IP is commonly thought of as a way of assigning subjective probabilities, it can 
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also be seen as a way of inferring objective probabilities. This means that using IP for assigning 
probabilities to events does not necessarily imply that these probabilities are subjective. Hence IP 
is relevant to both subjective and objective interpretations of probability.  
Recall that my purpose in this paper is to explain IP and its related paradoxes within 
Kolmogorov's theory. Therefore, it is sufficient to think of IP as a description of a connection 
between mathematical events and mathematical probabilities. The question whether IP is taken 
to be an epistemic principle or not, seems to be irrelevant to IP's mathematical formalization 
itself. Treating IP as a description of a mathematical connection between events and probabilities 
within Kolmogorov's probability theory framework is one of the keys which make my analysis 
relevant to all interpretations of Kolmogorov's theory. 
In the next section I give a general characterization of IP as a connection between events and 
probabilities in the aforementioned mathematical sense. 
 
 
2. A characterization of the Indifference Principle 
In this section I characterize the connection described by IP between events and probabilities. 
This characterization seems to be common to almost all of IP's different phrasings regardless of 
whether they are phrased within a framework of a subjective interpretation or an objective one.  
The connection described by IP has the following three components: 
1. Presumption - Events5 are comparable and thus can be considered as equivalent (or equal) in 
some sense.  
2. Assertion – Equivalent events have (or should have) equal probabilities. 
3. Conditionalization - There is no information indicating otherwise. Thus, equivalent events 
have equal probabilities if (or sometimes iff) there is no information indicating otherwise. 
                                                 




The connection between events and probabilities described by IP's assertion is that equivalent 
events have equal probabilities6. This connection relies on IP's presumption that events can be 
considered as equivalent in some sense. For example: "equipossible cases" (Fraassen 1989, 298), 
"equal parts of the possibility space" (Howson and Urbach 2006), "possibilities of which we 
have equal ignorance" (Shackel 2007, 151), etc. Notice that equivalent events are not necessarily 
identical (but identical events are trivially equivalent because they are the same event). The 
important point is that different events can be considered as equivalent according to some 
criteria. The specifics of the criteria commonly depend on the choice of interpretation of 
probability. Obviously, the criteria cannot be that the events have equal probabilities because 
then IP would be the trivial assertion that events with equal probabilities have equal 
probabilities. The key point is that IP relies on there being a way of comparing events and 
deciding that they are equivalent which does not depend on their probabilities. This presumption 
is a necessary condition for IP's assertion. If events cannot be considered as equal, IP's assertion 
does not hold. 
Furthermore, according to the third component, IP's assertion is also conditioned on the fact that 
there is no information indicating that equivalent events do not have equal probabilities7. For 
example: "[...] in the absence of reasons to the contrary." (Fraassen 1989, 299), "[...] relative to a 
null state of background information." (Howson and Urbach 2006, 266), "[...] iff we have 
insufficient reason to consider any one of these outcomes more or less likely than any other." 
(Mikkelson 2004, 137), "[...] if we have no grounds for preferring one [outcome] over any other 
[...]" (Norton 2008, 47), "[...] in the absence of any known reason to assign two events differing 
probabilities [...]" (Strevens 1998, 231), etc.)  
IP also implicitly relies on the trivial assumption that the probabilities of the events are not 
given. It is obvious that if the events' probabilities are given, then the connection between them 
is already given explicitly and there is no need for IP to draw a connection between them. In 
other words, when the events' probabilities are given, if equivalent events have equal 
probabilities then IP is redundant, and if they do not then IP cannot be used. Because the 
                                                 
6 IP also implicitly asserts that if one event (e1) is greater than another event (e2) (in the sense in which the events are 
comparable), then e1 has (or should have) greater probability than e2. 
7 Some have argued that this condition is insufficient, and that IP must also depend on information which positively 
indicates that equivalent events have equal probabilities. This is an important point concerning IP, however, it does 
not affect the argument presented in this paper. 
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condition that there is no information indicating that equivalent events do not have equal 
probabilities, is violated. In section 5, I show that given a σ-algebra which mathematically 
describes the events, the connection drawn by IP is described by a specific probability space 
whose σ-algebra component is the given one. Thus, this trivial assumption is important because 
it means that the probability space which describes the events is not already given.  
 
Another important assumption concerning IP is that it is implicitly assumed that given a set of 
events, an application of IP results with a unique assignment of probabilities to these events. This 
is a crucial assumption since, as I will show in this paper, it is at the heart of all of IP's related 
paradoxes. Roughly, in all IP related paradoxes, an event is assigned different probabilities by 
different applications of IP, and this result is considered as paradoxical. Hence, IP's assertion that 
equivalent events have equal probabilities (conditioned that there is no information indicating 
otherwise) also implicitly implies that the given equivalent events have specific (equal) 
probability values. In other words, IP asserts that equivalent events have specific equal 
probabilities and no other equal probability values.  
In the next section I discuss how applying IP can lead to paradoxes.  
 
 
3. The Indifference Principle related paradoxes 
Arguably applying IP is the most common way for assigning probabilities to events. In many 
cases it is used implicitly. The following paradigmatic examples are commonly presented as 
successful applications of IP:  
1. The assignment of probability 1/2 to the event of a coin toss landing on heads (or tails). The 
two events ('heads' and 'tails') are considered as equivalent, having no information indicating 
that the coin is biased, and hence are assigned equal probabilities.  
2. The assignment of probability 1/6 to each of the events of a die toss landing on one of its 
faces, assuming that the die is unbiased.  
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3. The assignment of probability 1/2 to the event of a dart hitting the left (or right) half of a 
target board. Assuming that the dart hits the board, the two events ('left' and 'right') are 
considered as equivalent (having no other information about the marksman, the board, or any 
other relevant factor) and hence have equal probabilities.  
 
Very roughly, in all these examples some events are considered as equivalent in some sense and 
hence according to IP, have equal probabilities. 
 
IP related paradoxes are often presented as examples of unsuccessful applications of IP in the 
sense that they do not result with a unique assignment of probabilities to events, in contrast to the 
implicit assumption mentioned in the previous section. Roughly, in each of these paradoxes there 
is a question about the probability of a given event. Each of these questions, is answered by 
applying IP. However, IP is applied in more than one way and as a result the event in question is 
assigned different probabilities by the different applications of IP. These different assignments of 
probabilities are commonly treated as paradoxical because of the aforementioned assumption 
that an application of IP on given events results with a unique assignment of probabilities to the 
given events.  
A simple example of an IP related paradox is the Box Factory Paradox: "A factory produces 
cubes with side-length between 0 and 1 foot; what is the probability that a randomly chosen cube 
has side-length between 0 and 1/2 a foot? The tempting answer is 1/2, as we imagine a process of 
production that is uniformly distributed over side-length. But the question could have been given 
an equivalent restatement: A factory produces cubes with face-area between 0 and 1 square-feet; 
what is the probability that a randomly chosen cube has face-area between 0 and 1/4 square-feet? 
Now the tempting answer is 1/4, as we imagine a process of production that is uniformly 
distributed over face-area. This is already disastrous, as we cannot allow the same event to have 
two different probabilities [...]. But there is worse to come, for the problem could have been 
restated equivalently again: A factory produces cubes with volume between 0 and 1 cubic feet; 
what is the probability that a randomly chosen cube has volume between 0 and 1/8 cubic-feet? 
Now the tempting answer is 1/8, as we imagine a process of production that is uniformly 
distributed over volume. And so on for all of the infinitely many equivalent reformulations of the 
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problem (in terms of the fourth, fifth, … power of the length, and indeed in terms of every non-
zero real-valued exponent of the length). What, then, is the probability of the event in question?" 
(Hájek 2012, sec. 3.1) 
In the Box Factory Paradox, IP is applied several times. Each application of IP gives a different 
answer to the question about the probability that a randomly chosen cube would have a certain 
size (and hence a certain side-length, face-area and volume). The paradox is the fact that the 
same event is attributed different probabilities by different applications of IP. In this sense, the 
Box Factory Paradox is an example of an unsuccessful use of IP.  
 
Bertrand's Paradox is perhaps the most famous example of an unsuccessful application of IP. It is 
commonly described as the fact that there are three different answers to the following question 
(taken from (Clark 2007)): "What is the chance that a random chord of a circle is longer than the 
side of an inscribed equilateral triangle? 
(1) The chords from a vertex of the triangle to the circumference are longer if they lie within the 
angle at the vertex. Since that is true of one-third of the chords, the probability is one-third. 
(2) The chords parallel to one side of such a triangle are longer if they intersect the inner half of 
the radius perpendicular to them, so that their midpoint falls within the triangle. So the 
probability is one-half. 
(3) A chord is also longer if its midpoint falls within a circle inscribed within the triangle. The 
inner circle will have a radius one-half and therefore an area one-quarter that of the outer one. So 
the probability is one-quarter." (Clark 2007, 22) 
The above three solutions to the question presented in Bertrand's Paradox are said to be the 
results of different applications of IP. Hence the paradox is that an "[a]pplication of the principle 
of indifference is supposed to suffice for solving probability problems. Probability problems 
have, of their nature, unique solutions, because a solution is a single function from the events of 
interest into [0, 1]. The solution being a function entails that each event has a unique probability. 
Yet different ways of applying the principle here result in different probabilities for the same 




Another important IP related paradox is the wine water paradox: "We are given a glass 
containing a mixture of water and wine. All that is known about the proportions of the liquids is 
that the mixture contains at least as much water as wine, and at most, twice as much water as 
wine. The range for our assumptions concerning the ratio of water to wine is thus the interval 1 
to 2. Assuming that nothing more is known about the mixture, the indifference or symmetry 
principle or any other similar form of the classical theory tells us to assume that equal parts of 
this interval have equal probabilities. The probability of the ratio lying between 1 and 1.5 is thus 
50%, and the other 50% corresponds to the probability of the range 1.5 to 2. 
But there is an a1ternative method of treating the same problem. Instead of the ratio water/wine, 
we consider the inverse ratio, wine/water; this we know lies between 1/2 and 1. We are again 
told to assume that the two halves of the total interval, i.e., the intervals 1/2 to 3/4 and 3/4 to 1, 
have equal probabilities (50% each); yet, the wine/water ratio 3/4 is equal to the water/wine ratio 
4/3. Thus, according to our second calculation, 50% probability corresponds to the water/wine 
range 1 to 4/3 and the remaining 50% to the range 4/3 to 2. According to the first calculation, the 
corresponding intervals were 1 to 3/2 and 3/2 to 2. The two results are obviously incompatible." 
(Von Mises 1981, 77) 
Like the Box Factory Paradox and Bertrand's Paradox, in the Wine Water Paradox we are 
presented with a question about the probability of an event and we are given different solutions 
to this question. Each of these solutions is the result of an application of IP. As such they are said 
to be "incompatible" and thus, the Wine Water Paradox is considered a paradox. 
 
To sum up, IP related paradoxes can be characterized as follows: 
1. There is a question about the probability of a given random event. 
2. The question is answered by applying IP. 
3. The problem is that the question is given different answers by different applications of IP. 
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4. The different answers are considered paradoxical because of the aforementioned assumption 
that applications of IP on given events result with a unique assignment of probabilities to the 
given events. 
 
Before I move on to describe how IP and its related paradoxes are manifested in Kolmogorov's 
theory, I wish to address the claim that these paradoxes are not well defined. Some writers have 
claimed that the questions posed (or the terms used) in the different IP related paradoxes are not 
well defined (they are vague, ambiguous, underdetermined, etc.). For example: "[...] Bertrand's 
original problem is vaguely posed [...]" (Marinoff 1994, 1), "Bertrand's problem cannot 
undermine Laplace's principle [i.e. IP] provided that the former is posed in non ambiguous terms 
[...]" (Aerts and de Bianchi 2014, 1), "[...] all so-called paradoxes to PI [i.e. IP] are simply 
disagreements and ambiguity in relation to sample space identification [...]" (Burock 2005, 2). 
Specifically, it has been claimed that the term 'random' is the source of the problem: 
"[randomness] is a notoriously difficult concept. In fact, it may not even be a single concept at 
all, but a cluster of concepts [...]" (Bangu 2010, 33), "Bertrand's paradox is of course not a 
logical paradox. The different results arise from assigning three different meanings to the phrase 
'at random' [...]" (Tissier 1984, 19).  
As already mentioned above, there is no consensus among philosophers regarding the exact 
meaning of the notion 'probability' and the same goes for 'randomness'. This lack of consensus is 
manifested in the different interpretation of probability theory. So philosophically speaking, IP 
related paradoxes and specifically the term 'random' might not be well defined. However, 
arguably anything that is considered as random according to some interpretation of probability, 
can be mathematically described by Kolmogorov's probability theory. This suggests that IP 
related paradoxes can be correctly described by his theory. The key point is that when such 
paradoxes are described by Kolmogorov's theory, they do not seem to be any more vague or 
ambiguous than any other mathematical question concerning the probability of a given event! 
Notice that such questions are exactly the sort of questions which appear in IP related paradoxes. 
In Kolmogorov's theory, such questions cannot be answered without being given the relevant 
probability spaces. And in all of IP related paradoxes, these spaces are assumed to be given by 
applying IP. However, applying IP within the framework of Kolmogorov's theory relies on 
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having a mathematical formalization of IP and, as I explain in the rest of this paper, this is an 
open problem. Thus, it would be more accurate to say that the problem with IP related paradoxes 
is that the mathematical formalization of IP is still an open question, rather than claim that they 
are not well defined. 
 
Since my aim in this paper is to explain IP and its related paradoxes based on the way they are 
manifested in Kolmogorov's probability theory, in the next section I give a brief description of 
Kolmogorov's probability space definition and emphasize how IP relates to it.  
 
 
4. Kolmogorov's probability space  
In this section I describe Kolmogorov's probability space definition8. I emphasize several points 
which are important for understanding IP and its related paradoxes and specifically how IP can 
be mathematically formalized within the framework of Kolmogorov's theory. 
 
Kolmogorov's probability space is defined as a triple <Ω,Σ,P> consisting of the following 
components: a sample space (Ω), a σ-algebra (Σ) and a probability measure (P). 
The probability space's components are defined as follows: 
1. A sample space (Ω) - a nonempty set.  
The members of the sample space are sometimes referred to as "elementary events". However, 
this name is misleading since these members are not a mathematical formalization of 'events'. 
'Events' are mathematically defined as the members of the σ-algebra component (which is 
defined just below). Nevertheless, there is a sense in which the sample space and its members are 
                                                 
8 The definition which I present in this paper is one of several standard ways to define Kolmogorov's probability 
space. See (Billingsley 1995, 23) for a slightly different definition.  
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indeed elementary, and it is the fact that Kolmogorov's mathematical formalizations of 'events' 
and 'probabilities' depend on them9.  
2. A σ-algebra (Σ) (defined over the sample space) - a subset of the power set of the sample 
space (i.e. a set of subsets of Ω) which satisfies the following conditions: 
2.1. Σ is not empty (or equivalently: Ω is in Σ) 
2.2. Σ is closed under complementation (i.e. if A is in Σ then so is Ω\A). 
2.3. Σ is closed under countable unions (i.e. if , , … are in Σ, then so is  =  ∪  ∪
 ∪ …) 
The members of Σ are Kolmogorov's mathematical formalization of 'events'. In other words, 
mathematically 'events' are sets of members of a sample space that together form a σ-algebra. 
Moreover, since the σ-algebra component is part of a given probability space, it is also connected 
to a specific probability measure. (The probability measure component is defined below). This 
means that mathematically 'events' are sets of members of a sample space that have specific 
probability values (described by the probability measure). This fact is very important to IP's 
formalization within Kolmogorov's theory. It is especially important to the formalization of IP's 
assertion that equivalent events have specific equal probabilities. 
3. A probability measure (P) - a real valued function defined over Σ which satisfies the 
following conditions: 
3.1. P is non-negative 
3.2. P
∅ = 0 
3.3. P is countably additive (which means that for all countable collections  of pairwise 
disjoint sets P
⋃   = 	∑ P
 ) 
3.4. P returns results in the unit interval [0,1] and P
Ω = 1 
The value assigned to a member of the σ-algebra ( ∈ Σ) by the probability measure function 
(i.e. P(e)) is the probability of e. This means that mathematically 'probabilities' are defined as the 
values of a real function from a σ-algebra to the unit interval which satisfies certain conditions 
(described by the definition of the probability measure).  
                                                 





A key point regarding the possible mathematical formalizations of IP within Kolmogorov's 
theory is that according to the probability space's definition the same mathematical events can 
have different probability values. This point relies on the assumption that the identity relation 
between mathematical events is the identity relation between σ-algebras10. In other words, two 
mathematical events are in fact the same, iff they belong to the same σ-algebra and are set-
theoretically identical (i.e. contain the same members). Notice that according to the probability 
space's definition, there can be infinitely many probability measures defined over the same σ-
algebra (except for trivial σ-algebras11). This means that the same mathematical events can have 
infinitely many different probability values. Notice however, that each time a σ-algebra has a 
different probability measure defined over it, it belongs to a different probability space. In other 
words, each time an event has a different probability, it necessarily belongs to a different 
probability space. 
This point is very important for understanding both IP's mathematical formalization and its 
related paradoxes. Recall that IP's assertion that equivalent events have equal probabilities 
implicitly implies that the equivalent events have specific equal probability values. Thus, they 
have these values and not any other equal probabilities. Loosely speaking, it is assumed that an 
application of IP results with a unique assignment of probabilities to events. Naively, the 
mathematical formalization of this assumptions seems to be the claim that given a set (S) of all 
probability spaces which have the same σ-algebra component (i.e. contain the same events), an 
application of IP is a way to depict exactly one probability space out of S. However, this 
formalization is in fact inaccurate. The reason is that different σ-algebras can be considered as 
equivalent in the sense that they mathematically describe the same events. Similarly, different 
probability spaces (due to their different σ-algebra components) can be considered as equivalent 
in the sense that they mathematically describe the same events when having the same specific 
probabilities. Thus, a more precise formalization of the above assumption that an application of 
IP ends with a unique assignment of probabilities to events, is that it is a way to depict all 
                                                 
10 Kolmogorov's theory in fact does not include an explicit definition of an identity relation between events. See D. 
D. November (2018, chap. 2) for a thorough discussion of this issue.  
11 A trivial σ-algebra is a σ-algebra that contains only the sample space event and the empty event. The only 
probability measure that can be defined over a given trivial σ-algebra is its corresponding trivial probability measure 
which assigns 1 to the sample space event and 0 to the empty event. 
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equivalent probability spaces out of all probability spaces which have equivalent σ-algebra 
components. In other words, an application of IP is a way to depict all probability spaces which 
mathematically describe the same events when having specific probabilities, out of all 
probability spaces which mathematically describe the same events. 
The idea that different probability spaces are equivalent in the sense that they can mathematically 
describe the same events having specific probabilities, seems to be widely accepted. For 
example, the following probability spaces: , and , are commonly considered as 
equivalent: , = 〈Ω,, Σ,, P,〉 where Ω, = 1,2, Σ, = ∅, Ω,, 1, 2  and P, 
assigns the following probabilities to the events in Σ,: 
P,
∅ = 0, 	P,!Ω," =
1, P,
1 =  , P,
2 =

. And , = 〈Ω,, Σ,, P,〉 where Ω, = 3,4, Σ, =
∅, Ω,, 3, 4  and P, assigns the following values to the events in Σ,: 
P,
∅ =
0, 	P,!Ω," = 1, P,
3 =  , P,
4 =

. The differences between , and , seem 
to be irrelevant for their expressive power. Anything describable by , is also describable by 
, and vice versa, simply by mapping the sample space members '1' and '2' from , to the 
members '3' and '4' from , respectively. Arguably (see D. D. November (2018, chap. 2)), the 
events mathematically describable by , and , are also describable by the following 
probability space (,) but with different probabilities: , = 〈Ω,, Σ,, P,〉 where Ω, =
5,6, Σ, = ∅, Ω,, 5, 6  and P, assigns the following probabilities to the events in Σ,: 

P,
∅ = 0, 	P,!Ω," = 1, P,
5 = ' , P,
6 =

'. The σ-algebra components of the 
above three probability spaces, ,, , and ,, seem to be equivalent in the sense that any 
set of events mathematically describable by one of them is also describable by the other two. 
(This can be done by mapping the members of Ω, to those of Ω, (or Ω,)). Thus, loosely 
speaking, all three probability spaces mathematically describe the same events because their 
corresponding σ-algebra components are equivalent. But only , and , describe them as 
having the same specific probabilities (1/3 and 2/3). According to , their probabilities are 
different (1/4 and 3/4). In other words, , and , are equivalent probability spaces while 




In this paper, I put aside the issues of equivalence relations between probability spaces and 
between σ-algebras. Instead, I focus on the much simpler case of probability spaces that have the 
same σ-algebra component. In other words, I take the set (Si) of all probability spaces which have 
the same σ-algebra component as a representative case of the set of all probability spaces which 
have equivalent σ-algebra components (Se). Notice that Si is contained in Se, because identical σ-
algebra components are trivially equivalent. I show that even in this much simpler case, there is 
no known mathematical formalization of IP which manages to depict exactly one probability 
space out of Si, and there is no known proof that there cannot be such a formalization. This 
implies that there is no known mathematical formalization of IP which manages to depict the set 
of all equivalent probability spaces out of Se, and that there is no known proof that there cannot 
be such a formalization. 
 
The fact that according to Kolmogorov's probability space definition, the same mathematical 
events can have different probabilities is important in understanding IP's related paradoxes. As 
already mentioned above, in all of IP's related paradoxes the same events are assigned different 
probabilities. These assignments are said to be the result of different applications of IP on these 
given events. The assignments of different probabilities to these events by applications of IP are 
considered as paradoxical because of the aforementioned implicit assumption that such 
applications should result with a unique assignment of probabilities to these events. It is 
important to understand that according to Kolmogorov's definition of the probability space, 
assignments of different probabilities to the same events in general are not considered as 
paradoxical. In other words, assignments of different probabilities by means which are not 
applications of IP, are not paradoxical. Such assignments are simply different probability spaces 
that have the same σ-algebra components (and hence the same sample space components12) but 
different probability measure components (i.e. <Ω,Σ,P1> and <Ω,Σ,P2> where P1≠P2). (In the rest 
of this paper I will refer to such probability spaces as: "same-events spaces"). Assignments of 
different probabilities to the same events by different applications of IP are considered as 
                                                 
12 Probability spaces that have the same σ-algebra components necessarily have the same sample space components. 
This is because a σ-algebra always contains the sample space which is defined over as a member. This means that σ-
algebras which are defined over different sample spaces have different members and thus are different. 
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paradoxical only because it is implicitly assumed that an application of IP depicts exactly one 
probability space from a given set of all same-events spaces. 
 
In the next section I elaborate on several important issues regarding IP's mathematical 
formalization within Kolmogorov's theory. 
 
 
5. IP's formalization within Kolmogorov's probability space 
In this section I discuss important issues regarding IP's mathematical formalization within the 
framework of Kolmogorov's probability theory. Roughly, I claim that IP's mathematical 
formalization has to be a set of constrains on probability spaces.  
Any mathematical formalization of IP has to address the three components of IP (IP's 
Presumption, Assertion and Conditionalization) and its underlying assumptions. The key issue is 
IP's assertion that equivalent events have specific equal probability values. Thus, a formalization 
of IP has to mathematically describe this connection between events and specific probabilities. 
Such a connection is mathematically described by a probability space. More accurately, given a 
σ-algebra which mathematically describes the events, the connection described by IP is 
mathematically described by a specific probability space whose σ-algebra component is the 
given one. Recall that there can be infinitely many probability spaces whose σ-algebra 
component is the same. This means that a mathematical formalization of IP has to be some 
mathematical way for uniquely selecting exactly one probability space from a given set of same-
events spaces. In other words, IP's mathematical formalization has to include constrains on sets 
of same-events spaces. Ideally, given a set of constrains (C) which is a mathematical 
formalization of IP, for each set (S) of same-events spaces, there is only one probability space (s) 
in S which satisfies the constrains in C. Furthermore, C is such that equivalent events in s have 
equal probabilities. Any such set of constrains would be a good mathematical formalization of IP 




In addition to IP's assertion, it seems that a mathematical formalization of IP has to also address 
IP's presumption and conditionalization. Unfortunately, unlike IP's assertion, it is not clear how 
these components should be mathematically formalized within Kolmogorov's framework. In the 
rest of this section, I show that IP's presumption that events are comparable should be formalized 
as an order relation on the σ-algebra component. However, it is not clear what are the specifics of 
such a relation or even whether such a relation exists within Kolmogorov's framework. I also 
show that IP's conditionalization should be mathematically formalized as a set of constrains on 
sets of same-events spaces. However, due to the formalization of IP's assertion, the formalization 
of IP's conditionalization turns out to be redundant. Moreover, it is not clear that IP's 
conditionalization can be formalized in a non-redundant way within Kolmogorov's framework.  
 
Recall that IP's presumption is that events are comparable. Generally, when things are claimed to 
be comparable (non-mathematically), this claim can be mathematically formalized as an order 
relation on the set of those things13. However, because there seem to be different non-
mathematical senses according to which events are compared and are considered as equivalent, it 
is not clear which mathematical order relation on the σ-algebra should be used to mathematically 
describe their comparableness.  
There are two obvious candidates for an order relation on the σ-algebra component. Both stem 
from the fact that according to Kolmogorov's definition events are sets. Unfortunately, both are 
unsuitable to be the mathematical formalization of IP's presumption. The first order relation is 
based on the inclusion relation between sets. According to this relation, a set A is considered 
strictly bigger than a set B iff A includes B and B does not include A (i.e.  > ) ⇔ 
) ⊆
	,-.	 ⊄ )). This means that A and B are considered as equivalent iff A includes B and B 
includes A (i.e.  ≡ ) ⇔ 
) ⊆ 	,-.	 ⊆ ))14. However, this relation fails to be a good 
mathematical description of the presumption that events are comparable because it is a partial 
                                                 
13 "Two elements a and b of A [where 
, ≤ is a partially ordered set] are said to be comparable if either a ≤ b or b 
≤ a." (Potter 2004, 104) 
14 More precisely, in set theory, such sets are in fact the same set. I.e. they are considered as identical (A=B) and not 
just as equivalent ( ≡ )). 
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order relation. This means that according to this relation it is possible that not all events in a 
given σ-algebra component are comparable! And that is a problem for IP's formalization because 
if there are events that cannot be compared, one cannot use IP to assign them probabilities. 
The second candidate for an order relation on the σ-algebra component is based on the events' 
cardinality. According to this relation, a set A is considered strictly bigger than a set B iff A's 
cardinality is strictly bigger than B's cardinality (i.e.  > ) ⇔ 2
) > 2
). Which also means 
that A and B are considered as equivalent iff A's cardinality is equal to B's cardinality (i.e.  ≡
) ⇔ 2
) = 2
). This order relation is a total order relation which means that all events are 
comparable. However, it cannot serve as a mathematical description of IP's presumptions that 
events are comparable because of IP's assertion that equivalent events have equal probabilities. 
The reason is that there are cases for which comparing events by their cardinality and assigning 
them probabilities accordingly by using IP, contradicts Kolmogorov's definition. More 
specifically, the problem arises in cases when the sample space has cardinality of at least א0 and 
there are two mutually exclusive events whose union is the sample space event (i.e. , e	|	 ∪
 = Ω) and they all have the same cardinality (i.e. 2
 = 2
 = 2
Ω). In such cases, 









Ω = 1. Unfortunately, there is no way to satisfy these three conditions 
together in Kolmogorov's theory. In such cases, either 5




contrast to Kolmogorov's definition, or the probabilities of events with equal cardinality are not 
equal. The latter option means that when IP's presumption is formalized using an order relation 
based on cardinality, IP's assertion can turn out to be false. This means that the mathematical 
formalization of IP's presumption cannot be the cardinality-based order relation. 
The above two failed attempts to formalize IP's presumption, are based solely on the fact that 
events are sets. This seems to suggest that any other attempt to formalize IP's presumption will 
require an order relation on the σ-algebra component which would be based on some additional 
information to the fact that events are sets. As such, any other attempt to formalize IP's 
presumption would require an addition to Kolmogorov's definition of events. (For example, 
Shackel's assumption which I discuss below, that the σ-algebra component has a measure defined 
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over it which is not a probability measure, and that the order relation between events is based on 
their measure values).  
 
The third component of IP is its conditionalization that equivalent events have equal probabilities 
only if there is no information indicating otherwise. Here the main question is how to 
mathematically describe the (non-mathematical) information which indicates that equivalent 
events do not have equal probabilities. It seems that there can be very different pieces of 
information which indicate the above, and thus it is not clear that all of them can be described by 
the same mathematical description. However, they all have one thing in common which is that 
they indicate that equivalent events do not have equal probabilities. In other words, they are 
different pieces of information which dismiss the possibility that equivalent events have equal 
probabilities. Thus, a formalization of any such piece of information would be a mathematical 
way for selecting one or more probability spaces from a given set of same-events spaces (S) such 
that in the selected spaces equivalent events do not have equal probabilities. In other words, a 
formalization of such information would be a set of constrains (Ccond) on a given S which 
restricts it to one or more spaces in which equivalent events do not have equal probabilities. 
However, the mathematical formalization of IP's assertion as a set of constrains (C) on a set of 
same events spaces, already precludes Ccond and thus makes it redundant! Recall that IP's 
assertion is conditioned on IP's conditionalization which means that C holds iff there is no Ccond 
given. But this is trivially true because any s in S which satisfies C is a space in which equivalent 
events have equal probabilities, and thus s does not satisfy Ccond. This means that when IP's 
assertion is formalized as C, IP's conditionalization is redundant and there is no need to explicitly 
formalize it. As a result, it turns out that the mathematical formalization of IP within 
Kolmogorov's theory must be a set of constrains on same-events spaces that is accompanied with 
a suitable order relation the σ-algebra component.  
 
In the next section I discuss the important implication of IP's formalization to its validity. But 
before I do so, I would like to address Shackel's discussion of Bertrand's Paradox. This 
discussion is important mainly because it includes one of the few attempts to explicitly 
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mathematically formalize IP. In his paper, Shackel mathematically defines IP as follows: 
"Principle of Indifference for Continuum Sized Sets. For a continuum sized set X, given a σ-
algebra, Σ, on X and a measure, µ, on Σ, and given that we have no reason to discriminate 
between members of Σ with equal measures, then we assign equiprobability to members of Σ 




:. (This can easily be 
achieved by setting 
9 = 8
9 8
;⁄  for all x in Σ.)" (Shackel 2007, 159). Notice that 
Shackel's mathematical formalization of IP includes a formalization of IP's presumption and 
assertion and it does not include a formalization of IP's conditionalization. According to Shackel, 
the formalization of IP's presumption is that events are comparable by their measure values. 
Hence, equivalent events are events that have equal measure values. In other words, Shackel 
implicitly defines an order relation on σ-algebras that is based on the measure values of the 
events. Shackel even provides a method for assigning probabilities to events which guarantees 
that events with equal measure values (i.e. equivalent events) have specific equal probability 
values15.  
The problem with Shackel's formalization of IP lies in his formalization of IP's presumption. The 
key point is that this formalization relies on a strong assumption that is not part of Kolmogorov's 
theory. More specifically, Shackel assumes that each σ-algebra is given with a "regular" measure 
defined over it (i.e. a measure which is not a probability measure, at least not necessarily). This 
"regular" measure can be seen as an additional component to Kolmogorov's probability space. 
(According to its definition, the probability space includes only a probability measure component 
defined over the σ-algebra component). Due to his assumption, Shackel's formalization faces a 
serious problem: mathematically there can be infinitely many measures defined over any given 
σ-algebra. Hence it is unclear which one of these measures should be taken as the "regular" 
measure in Shackel's mathematical formalization of IP16. Without some way of choosing one of 
these "regular" measures, Shackel's mathematical formalization of IP's presumption is 
                                                 
15 Shackel relies on the fact that a probability measure is a special kind of measure. Notice that conditions 3.1-3.3 of 
the aforementioned probability measure's definition are just the formal definition of the mathematical notion of 
measure. Any measure which satisfies condition 3.4 is a probability measure. 
16
 This problem was already noticed by Gyenis and Rédei. According to them: "[...] there are infinitely many 
measures µ on S [a Boolean σ-algebra of certain subsets of X] that could in principle be taken as ones that define a 
probability p. Which one should be singled out that yields a p that could in principle be interpreted as expressing 
epistemic indifference about elements in X?" (Gyenis and Rédei 2014, 7)  
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incomplete. This means that without such a way, Shackel's formalization of IP remains not well 
defined and hence, despite its appeal, it cannot serve as a mathematical formalization of IP. 
 
The mathematical formalization of IP I have described above clarifies another issue concerning 
IP related paradoxes. Roughly, it shows that a certain type of solutions is simply misguided. 
More specifically, some writers (for examples (Di Porto et al. 2010, 2011)) believe that 
probabilities can only be obtained by measuring actual frequencies. (Since they adhere to 
(perhaps implicitly) an objective interpretation of probability). This means that according to 
them, IP related paradoxes can be solved by measuring the relevant frequencies. I call this type 
of solutions the "physical approach". The above mathematical formalization of IP shows that this 
approach cannot succeed. 
Recall that in every IP related paradox there is a question about the probability of a given event 
and that this question is given different answers by different applications of IP. Roughly, a 
physical approach solution to a given IP related paradox "solves" the paradox by running the 
"right" experiment. The right experiment is supposed to express the correct way in which IP 
should be applied. More accurately, a physical approach solution to an IP related paradox is the 
claim that the probability of the event in question can be obtained by measuring the relative 
frequency of the event when running the experiment in which IP is applied correctly.  
However, the physical approach to IP related paradoxes simply does not address the real problem 
raised by such paradoxes. As I have shown above, the mathematical formalization of IP is a set 
of constrains (C) on same-events spaces (S). The problem is to find such a C that for every S 
there is only one probability space in S which satisfies the constrains in C. This is a mathematical 
problem. As such, it does not depend on a particular interpretation of probability. Specifically, it 
does not depend on the interpretation being an objective one and furthermore it does not depend 
on relative frequencies.  
It is true that it is commonly held that there is a connection between relative frequencies and 
probabilities (expressed by the laws of large numbers). This means that relative frequencies can 
confirm or cast doubts on a priori assignments of probabilities. However, and this is the crucial 
point, relative frequencies can confirm or undermine assignments of probabilities only after these 
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assignments have been made! This means that they can confirm or undermine probabilities set by 
applications of IP only after IP has been used. And IP can be used only after it has been 
mathematically formalized. Hence measuring relative frequencies cannot serve as a mean to 
mathematically formalize IP and as a result it cannot solve IP related paradoxes. 
 
 
6. The implication of IP's formalization to its validity 
The major question concerning IP's mathematical formalization as a set of constrains on same-
events spaces, is the existence of such a set. Is there a set of constrains (C) which manages to 
constrain every set of same-events spaces in such a way that only one space in each of these sets 
satisfies C? This question is highly important. Mainly because a positive answer to this question 
settles the debate concerning whether IP related paradoxes are genuine paradoxes or not. A 
positive answer to the existence question means that there is at least one set of constrains that is 
always satisfied by only one probability space in every set of same-events spaces. In other 
words, there are no cases when IP's set of constrains (C) fails to constrain a given set of same-
events spaces (S) so that only one probability space in S satisfies the constrains in C. Hence if the 
answer to the existence question is positive then there are no cases of IP related paradoxes. This 
means that all IP related paradoxes are not genuine paradoxes and the aforementioned debate is 
settled.17 
On the other hand, a negative answer to the existence question means that there is no 
mathematical formalization of IP as a set of constrains (C) that is always satisfied by only one 
probability space in every set of same-events spaces (S). In other words, there are cases that 
either zero or more than one probability spaces in the given S, satisfy C. This means that there is 
at least one genuine IP related paradox. Thus, it is possible that Bertrand's Paradox or the Box 
Factory Paradox or the Wine Water Paradox, are indeed genuine IP related paradoxes.  
                                                 
17 A positive answer to the existence question raises an interesting question regarding the uniqueness of C: is this C 
unique or is there more than one such set of constrains? I do not address this question in this paper. 
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A negative answer to the existence question can also be seen as a solution to IP related paradoxes 
in the sense that it refutes one of their premises. Recall that IP related paradoxes rely on the 
assumption that IP is always sufficient for a unique assignment of probabilities to events. Notice 
however that a negative answer to the existence question would be a mathematical proof that this 
assumption is plain wrong. This means that a negative answer refutes one of the premises of IP 
related paradoxes and in this sense, solves them. 
Moreover, a negative answer to the existence question implies that IP is not a valid principle in 
the sense that applying it does not always result with a unique assignment of probabilities to 
events. As a result, the discussion surrounding IP should change: Instead of discussing whether 
IP is a valid principle or not (a negative answer to the existence question shows that it is not), the 
discussion should be on characterizing the cases when it is safe to use IP, if there are any such 
cases. 
 
The above discussion regarding the existence question sheds new light on Jaynes' famous paper 
on Bertrand's Paradox: "The Well-Posed Problem". In this paper Jaynes presents one of the most 
famous solutions offered to Bertrand's Paradox. Roughly, Jaynes believes that the question in 
Bertrand's Paradox, as any other probability problem, must have a unique solution: "The 
essential point is this: If we start with the assumption that Bertrand's problem has a definite 
solution in spite of the many things left unspecified, then the statement of the problem 
automatically implies certain invariance properties [...]" (Jaynes 1973, 480). Jaynes adds that 
"The transformation group, which expresses these invariances mathematically, imposes definite 
restrictions on the form of the solution, and in many cases fully determines it." (Jaynes 1973, 
488). Recall that a solution to Bertrand's Paradox is the probability of the event that a random 
chord of a circle is longer than the side of an inscribed equilateral triangle. This solution is 
mathematically described by a probability space. Hence Jaynes' invariance requirements of a 
solution to Bertrand's Paradox can be thought of as (and even translated to) a set of constrains on 




Now the questions are: what exactly is Jaynes' set of constrains (Cj) and more importantly, does 
it provide a positive answer to the existence question? In other words, does Cj manages to 
constrain every set of same-events spaces in such a way that only one space in each of these sets 
satisfies Cj? Unfortunately, it seems that the answer is 'no'. Even according to Jaynes: "There 
remains the interesting, and still unanswered, question of how to define precisely the class of 
problems which can be solved by the method illustrated here. There are many problems in which 
we do not see how to apply it unambiguously; von Mises' water-and-wine problem is a good 
example." (Jaynes 1973, 490). In other words, Jaynes believes that his set of constrains does not 
manage to constrain every set of same-events spaces to just one. Specifically, Jaynes' set of 
constrains fails in the case of the Wine Water Paradox18. This means that Jaynes does not 
provide a positive answer to the existence question and the status of IP as a valid principle 
remains unknown. 
 
I hope that the above discussion clarifies the importance of the existence question of IP's 
mathematical formalization. However, despite its importance, to my best knowledge there has 
not been any explicit attempt to answer it. Mainly because IP's mathematical formalization has 
not been widely covered in the literature (notable exceptions are (Shackel 2007) (discussed 
above) and (Gyenis and Rédei 2014)). This does not mean that IP does not have a mathematical 
formalization, on the contrary. Since almost all writers about IP claim that they apply IP in 
different circumstances, it seems that each of them has in mind some implicit mathematical 
formalization of IP. These formalizations are used implicitly in each of the writers' calculations 
when IP is applied. However, since commonly IP is not explicitly formalized, it is not clear 
whether IP has one specific (implicit) mathematical formalization which can be considered as the 
mathematical formalization of IP. More importantly, this means that currently the existence 
question is still unanswered and thus the question regarding IP's validity remains open. 
                                                 
18 Moreover, according to Drory, Jaynes' set of constrains is not even sufficient to solve Bertrand's Paradox! Drory 
claims that: "[...] each of these solutions [the three answers which appear in Bertrand's Paradox] can be supported by 
invariance requirements and even by the very same requirements, in the sense that they will be all called rotation, 
scaling and translation invariance." (Drory 2015, 458). In other words, Drory believes that each of the three 
probability spaces which mathematically describe the three answers, satisfies Cj (Jaynes' invariance requirements). 
Hence Cj fails to be a good mathematical formalization of IP. See also (Nathan 1984) for a more general objection to 
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